During 1941 it was foresaw that the Messerschmitt Me.210 would eventually replace the Bf.110, so production of the Bf.110 was terminated, with production ceasing at MIAG in October 1941 and GWF one month later. However, the Me.210 proved to be disappointing, so deliveries of the Bf.110F were resumed in February 1942.
Some measures were already taken in the summer of 1941 to update the basic design of the Bf.110. Under the pre-production designation of Bf.110G-0, the fuselage was aerodynamically cleaned up and engines were upgraded to a pair of DB.601F, rated at 1.475hp each at take off and emergency landing.
The initial production variant, G-1 had the MG FF machine guns replaced with a pair of MG 151 and had the ETC bomb racks removed. This variant, the G-1 was not built and, instead, the G-2 was put into production, which through the application of various Rüstsätze (Field Conversion Sets) could be employed either as a Zerstörer of fighter-bomber. Thanks to those Rüstsätze, the G variant were the most versatile of the Bf.110 saga, with the first G-2 entering service in May 1942.
The Bf.110G-3 was a reconnaissance variant, which was put into production in 1943 and was preceded on the assembly lines by the G-4. It was equipped with an Rb 50/30 or 70/30 camera installed in lieu of the ventral weapons. Although the rest of the armament remained the same, there was an additional weapon in the form of a Waffentropfen, a 20mm MG 151/20 cannon placed under the belly, which fired rearwards. In order to increase its range, this version could carry two 300L (66 gal) drop tanks under the wings. A single Rüstsätze, the R3 was present on this variant, which replaced the nose machine guns by two Mk 108 cannons.
The Bf.110G-4 was the last version and, together with the Bf.110C, was also the most numerous. It was designed for night-fighting duties and was designed from the outset to carry a radar in the form of Umrüst Bausätze (U- factory conversions), with extra protection at the front of the canopy for the pilot and the rest of the crew. Its production began in parallel to that of the G-2 and the F-4 and was put into service at the end of 1942.
It was equipped with the same weapon arrangement as the previous variants (two 20mm MG 151/20 and four 7.92mm MG 17 forward-firing machine guns plus two flexible MG 81Z in the rear cockpit). For this variant, the letter added to the suffix marked the type of radar carried, so, for instance a Bf.110G-4a was equipped with a FuG 212 Lichtenstein C-1 with four nose antennaes.
The main setback of this variant was the additional third crew member as a radar operator, which meant extra weight, however, he was not always needed but, when he was present, it was extra difficult to bail out for the radio operator.
At the beginning of 1945 only II., III. and IV./NJG 1 and I./NJG 3 were still completely equipped with the Bf.110G-4, sharing space alongside other machines such as the Junkers Ju.88 or the Heinkel He.219 in other groups such as II., III. and IV./NJG 5. In March 1945 there were practically none left in the reconnaissance or Zerstörer units and, with less than fifty produced, total production rose up to 6.050 examples of all versions.
After the Bf.110 was withdrawn from the daylight fighting, the Bf.110 had a success as a night fighter, thanks to its range and firepower, so it wasn't long until the Bf.110 became the backbone of the Nachtjagdgeschwader (Night fighting wings) throughout the whole conflict. In fact, the first units overtook night defence operations in as early as autumn 1940, facing light opposition until 1942 when the first British heavy bombers appeared.
One of the most remarkable actions of the Bf.110 doing night-fighting duties, took place on the night of 17 to 18 August 1943. Some machines were equipped with the experimental Schräge Musik system, a two upward-firing cannon arrangement which in its initial installations, it was placed almost midway down the cockpit behind the pilot, allowing this way to attack the blind spot of both the Avro Lancaster and the Handley Page Halifax bombers, which lacked a ventral turret. Employing this tactic, Leutnant Peter Erhardt destroyed four bomber in 30 minutes and, in spite of their excellent visibility, none of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) bombers reported nothing out of the usual that could point to a new weapon or tactic in the German night fighter force.
This ignorance was aggravated by the traceless ammunition used by the Bf.110s and the bombers' blind spots. Many RAF crews witnessed a sudden explosion of a friendly aircraft and assumed, in some cases, that it was caused by a very accurate flak, as very few of the German fighter were seen, let alone fired on. Later on, the Bf.110G-4 placed the Schräge Musik system at the extreme rear of the cabin to make room for the radar operator.
In September 1943 Arthur Harris pressed on the strategic bombing of German cities, even if losses in RAF's Bomber Command were severe. The Bf.110 was responsible for the shooting down of some 2.751 RAF bombers in 1943, together with the cooperation of flak and other night fighters. Later, the RAF developed a radar countermeasure to blind German radar and, with the introduction of the De Havilland Mosquito, which were used to fly feints and diver the Bf.110s and other night fighters from their true targets, with initial successes. At this time the Bf.110 remained as the backbone of the German night fighting force, although now it was being reinforced by the Junkers Ju.88 bomber reconverted as a night fighter.
In October 1943 General Josef Kammhuber denounced the unacceptability of the climbing attrition rate. This meant the most vulnerable moment for the Bf.110, when it was gaining altitude and urged Herman Göring to stop committing German night fighters to daylight operations, as many Nachtjagdgeschwader were employed in costly daylight battles of attrition. In fact, from June to August 1943 it had increased from around 2% to 9.8%. However, the luck for the mostly Bf.110-equipped force changed during late August/September 1943 as the night fighter arm claimed the destruction of 123 out of 1,179 bombers over Hamburg one night, meaning a 7.2% loss rate. During the aerial Battle of Berlin (November 1943 to March 1944) a total of 1.128 RAF bombers were lost in just five months, with the RAF's Bomber Command had 'nearly burned out'.
Those losses were mainly a result of fighter defences, at the core of which was the Bf.110. The German defences had won a victory which prevented deep penetration raids for a time. However, Luftwaffe's losses were high as 15% of crews were killed in the first three months of 1944.
Sources:
1st Signal Squadron - Aircraft In action 1030 - Messerschmitt Bf-110 Zerstörer in Action
2nd Histoire & Collections - Avions et Pilotes 11 - Messerschmitt Bf.110 & Me.210-410 1939 -1945
3rd https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_110_operational_history













