This post is a direct continuation of this one:
Messerschmitt Bf.110 in service with the Luftwaffe. Part three. Blitzkrieg on the North & the West.
Barely one year after the beginning of its fighting career, the Bf.110 began to show its defects. After months of mixed results, the concept of the of the Zerstörer had to be seriously rethought, if not discarded entirely.
Just one few weeks after the fall of France, in early July 1940 the Third Reich began with what they considered the final stage of their conquest of Western Europe: the Operation Sealion, codename for the Invasion of England. This was expected to be costly both in men and materiel, it was decided to make sure that the Luftwaffe had the aerial superiority over British skies before the land forces were sent against the south-eastern coast of England. The plan comprised first reducing the sea traffic to nothing in the Channel and the North Sea and then destroying British airfields with massive air raids, employing conventional or dive bombers, under the protection of single-seat or twin-engined fighters.
Taking that into consideration, on 9th July 1940 General Kesselring, commander of Luftflotte 2, whose zone of operations ranged from the Netherlands to Normandy, decided to throw his Zerstörer groups (IE, the Bf.110-equipped units) into the battle for the first time since the Battle of France, with 220 Bf.110Cs being available at that moment.
On that same day, a naval convoy was spotted entering the Channel so it was decided to intercept it using a large formation of bombers protected by Bf.110Cs. After some chaotical fighting due to bad weather conditions, four the of the Bf.110s were shot down by Royal Air Force's (RAF) Hurricanes.
Even if the loss ratios were not abysmal (the RAF lost the same number of planes during the initial engagements), the Zerstörers failed in their assigned role and showed again how vulnerable they were when they had to face a more manoeuvrable enemy.
The different Bf.110 units engaged in the Battle of Britain were more or less successful in the many clashes that took place over Sussex and Kent.
Often at their own cost the Bf.110 pilots had to cope with the shortcomings of their own machines almost on a daily basis, such as sluggish acceleration and low top speed which prevented them from breaking off formation, when necessary to fight. This was emphasized when facing both the Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire.
In order to counter the type less vulnerable, a new tactic was developed over Dunkirk during the closing stages of the Battle of France and was employed to good effect. This consisted on the Bf.110s forming a defensive circle if they were attacked, with the Zerstörers circling in line astern at the same altitude, protecting each other from enemy attacks with both their defensive and offensive weapons. However, this meant that an aircraft designed mainly as an attack plane couldn't perform offensive actions, but defensive one.
Hermann Göring, the creator of the Zerstörer concept, was personally affected by the initial losses, since his own nephew, Hans-Joachim, a pilot assigned to III./ZG 76 was shot down by Hurricanes on 11th July 1940 over Weymouth Bay.
The Luftwaffe almost succeeded in closing the Channel to all maritime shipping and therefore, moved on to the second phase on the Attack on Britain, called Adlertag (Eagle Day), which took place on 13th August. On that day a massive aerial raid took place, with the Bf.110s claiming approximately thirty kills at the cost of thirteen of their own machines, which made Göring furious. However, the worst day for the Bf.110 during the Battle of Britain was 15th August, when losses topped to thirty planes shot down or damaged beyond repair. Thirty aircraft was the equivalent of a Gruppe for the Luftwaffe.
To make things worse, three experimented Gruppenkommandeurs (Group Commanders - the equivalent to Wing Commanders in the RAF) were killed during the various engagements when a group of approximately twenty Bf.110D-s based in Norway took part in the attacks; they could be recognized by their extra ventral fuel tank which hampered their manoeuvrability, even if their range was longer. One third of those D-1s which took part in the raid were shot down by British fighters which considered them an easy prey.
During the following days of August the situation got only worse, specially for ZG 76, the main unit operating Bf.110s as their casualties kept on rising at an unrelenting rate. On 17th August ZG 76 alone lost fifteen machines, totalling 120 machines by the end of the month.
On 18th August Bf.110 activity began to decline for the simple reason that the Luftwaffe couldn't make up the losses they were suffering and the number of available machines was starting to be dangerously low.
Despite all this, Göring, recently promoted to Reichsmarschall, decided to keep the Bf.110s in frontline service by assigning them to missions not suitable for single-engined fighters: those deep inside British territory. With the Luftwaffe still not having enough single-seat fighters, the Bf.110s still available were thrown into the Battle of London, which was part of the second stage of the Battle of Britain, with dramatic results as expected.
Furthermore, nothing could be done to improve the situation, not even decorating certain Bf.110 unit commanders to boost morale in those seriously beaten units.
On 4th and 27th September a total of fifteen machines were lost, serving with the Erprobungsgruppe 210 (another unit operating the Bf.110), losing on this occasion its third Commanding Officer in as many weeks. When Sealion was finally discarded, 223 out of a total of 237 operational Bf.110s were lost.
The end of the Battle of Britain sealed the fate of Göring's Zerstörerwaffe concept and the Bf.110 was withdrawn from frontline units, which were either disbanded, just like ZG.2 in October 1940 or sent to the rearguard, like ZG.26 (which lost seven machines on 7th October) or ZG.76.
Just like it happened to the Stuka, the other Luftwaffe icon of the Blitzkrieg, it was decided to send the Bf.110 to the other safer theatres of operations, and the Bf.110 no longer saw daytime combat on the Western Front.
Sources:
1st Histoire & Collections - Avions et Pilotes 11 - Messerschmitt Bf.110 & Me.210-410 1939 -1945
2nd https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_110_operational_history













